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CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION. By Charles Donahue, Jr., Thomas 
E. Kauper, and Peter W. Martin. St. Paul: West. 1974. Pp. lxiii, 
1501. $22.50. 
The title of their casebook-Property: An Introduction to the 
Concept and the Institution-suggests the formidable task that Pro-
fessors Donahue, Kauper, and Martin have set themselves. It is a 
task they have performed with enthusiasm, and the book they have 
produced is positively exuberant, overflowing with intellectual vi-
tality and excitement. There are certain pedagogical advantages to 
be gained from intellectual enthusiasm, not least of which is that 
it is so often contagious. 
Apart from the task of arousing intellectual energy, however, 
there are three distinct but related problems that confront the 
writer of a first-year casebook on property. The first is how to im-
pose thematic unity upon the disparate legal questions that inhere 
in the property course.1 The solution of this problem is not mark-
edly advanced by the fact that one can describe, in an admittedly 
general but nevertheless accurate manner, the substantive content 
of the usual property course as the legal relationship among per-
sons with respect to things. The very generality of the description is 
necessary to its accuracy, which perhaps indicates that both the con-
cepts and the social realities investigated in the course are so multi-
farious that only when very broadly conceived can they be seen to 
have a logical connection with one another. Possession of wild ani-
mals and gifts of personal property, for example, are two topics that 
are often covered in the "personal property" aspect of the course. 
These topics both deal ·with the legal relationships of persons to 
things; in a conceptual sense they are somewhat unified by a com-
mon concern about "dominion and control." Apart from that bond, 
however, there is little obvious logical relationship between them. 
More importantly, the social realities to which the law of these two 
topics is addressed apparently raise different policy questions. 
A similar lack of logical connection characterizes the topics 
covered in the real property segment of the course. Again, the social 
phenomena that call upon the law for resolution raise policy ques-
tions that are more apparently different than obviously similar. 
Apart from being somehow "about" people and their relationship 
to Blackacre, what has the law of estates in land to do with the law 
of nuisance, that of adverse possession with that of zoning, that of 
1. See Tarlock, Book Review, 21 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1266, 1276 (1969). 
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recording acts and title insurance with that of waste, that of land-
lord and tenant relationships with that of conveyancing? 
Thus, the first task of a writer on property is to find the hidden 
thread that binds these topics together-or rather to weave a pattern 
into which they all comfortably fit. This organized pattern or prin-
ciple will reflect an author's pedagogical priorities. For example, an 
author might unify his book simply by making it responsive to cur-
ricular needs as he perceives them.2 Or he might impose a pattern 
on the material by taking a consistently functional or problem ap-
proach,8 instead of a conceptual one. Or he might organize his 
material around one or another of the social processes-land devel-
opment,4 for example-with which the usual property course is only 
partially concerned. The point is that an organizational principle 
must be embraced, a unifying theme chosen. 
The second issue that the writer of a first-year property casebook 
must face is the choice of topics to be covered. There is no uni-
formity of view about the curricular needs that the course ought to 
meet.5 The answer may be dictated by the author's choice of unify-
ing theme; a number of books, for example, have sought thematic 
unity simply by adopting a unique and coherent view of the topics 
that should be covered.6 But the choice of unifying theme will not 
always imply the topics to be covered and, in any event, the issue of 
coverage must be resolved. 
The third problem that confronts the author is how to accom-
plish the most basic tasks of the first year-the elucidation of doc-
trinal concepts and the development of the analytical skills that are 
the first requisites to practicing law. Are cases and statutes, presented 
in the traditional format, to be the principal vehicles for conveying 
substantive information and encouraging analytical effort? Or is 
the problem method more effective? How much textual exposition 
of doctrine should be offered? How much historical material should 
be presented? What kinds of questions should be integrated into the 
materials? By whatever organizing principle is chosen to guide the 
arrangement and presentation of materials, by whatever criteria one 
selects the topics to be covered, there is no escape from the necessity 
to confront the relevant legal doctrine. And surely the development 
of analytical skills so informs the function of the first year that it 
must be an implicit aspect of nearly every choice made by first-year 
casebook ·writers. 
2. E.g., C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (1968). 
3. E.g., E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MoDERN REAL PROPERTY LAW (1974). 
4. E.g., G. LEFcoE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW (1966). 
5. See, e.g., Cribbet, Property in the First Year, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 55 (1965); Jacob, 
Book Review, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 873 (1968); Meyers, Book Review, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 
742 (1968). 
6. E.g., C. BERGER, supra note 2. 
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Turning to the manner in which this book has resolved these 
three problems, let us look first at the question of thematic unity. 
As Professors Donahue, Kauper, and Martin see it, "the tendency 
has been to use the commercial transactions in land as the organiz-
ing theme for the first-year [property] course" (p. xix). They view 
that tendency with alarm, for they see it as placing "too much 
-emphasis on commercial land transactions and not enough on prop-
erty generally, on property as a legal idea and as a set of legal insti-
tutions" (p. xix). Emphasis on commercial land transactions seems 
to them to foster the misleading idea "that property consists of a 
series of detailed and usually incomprehensible rules .. .'' (p. xix). 
They purport to adopt instead the organizing principle that "the 
first property course ... must be a survey course in which unity is 
provided by developing the theme of the c~ncept and institution of 
property in as many of its manifestations as can be covered in the 
time allowed, without sacrificing depth and subtlety" (p. xix). 
The book is faithful to, and to an extent unified by, its purpose 
to survey a broad range of property law. Moreover, the intellectual 
atmosphere of the book is generally characterized more by the pur-
suit of abstractions that inhere in a "conceptual" approach than by 
an effort to discern the practical operation of legal rules. These 
features give the book a certain methodological consistency, but 
they do not make the book a thematic whole. Moreover, they con-
tribute little by way of a cure for the book's major defect, which is its 
failure to achieve a focused thematic unity in terms of the concept 
of property. 
It might well be useful-and it is undoubtedly possible-to 
organize a first-year property course around a sustained effort to 
develop a unified series of systematic generalizations about property 
law. Such an effort would indeed encompass significantly more than 
the presentation of "a series of detailed and usually incomprehen-
sible rules," qua rules. It would, by its effort to formulate systematic 
generalizations about the rules, put integrative force behind "the 
concept and institution" of property. 
Economic analysis offers an example of one very promising 
means by which conceptual coherence could be imposed upon the 
subject of property. "The institution of private property, after all, 
serves as a linchpin of our economic organization,"7 and the goal 
of efficient resource allocation is surely one in terms of which much 
of the law of private property-if not, indeed, the very creation of 
private rights in property8-can be systematically organized, under-
stood, and evaluated.0 The concept of economic efficiency has been 
7. B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975). 
8. · See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 347 (1967), 
9. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-40 (1973). 
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criticized for its tendency to lead one to see the world in one-dimen-
sional terms.10 But it seems to me that the efficiency notion has the 
important potential for permitting generalizations to proceed in a 
context in which, precisely because a conceptual framework is 
provided, it is possible to identify and isolate for analytical purposes 
other values that compete with efficiency for recognition and imple-
mentation. The fault of this book, however, is not that it fails to use 
economiG analysis as its organizing principle, but that it fails to 
adopt any organizing principle. 
That the book fails in this regard seems traceable to two of its 
principal aspects. First, it does not pursue a consistent view of "the 
concept and institution of property." Second, thematic attention 
has not even been concentrated on "property," the authors having 
chosen to develop a number of related themes as well. 
Instead of providing an overriding framework for a conceptual 
view of property, the book offers a smorgasbord of ideas about and 
approaches to property rules and rights. Chapter II, for example, 
purports to deal with property in an "abstract form" and to "seek a 
definition of what is property" (p. xv). In section I, the authors try 
to move "toward a definition of property" (p. 155) by comparing 
property rights and civil rights, at least to the extent that distinc-
tions benveen the nvo emerge from such constitutional cases as 
Shelley v. Kraemer,11 Bell v. Maryland,12 State v. Shack,13 and Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.14 The section seems ultimately to conclude 
that property can be defined so as to focus on the right to exclude 
(p. 218). The chapter then slides almost imperceptibly from the de-
scriptive effort to a normative one: It labels as "both classic and 
farsighted" (p. 220) an excerpt from the writings of Morris Cohen 
that exhorts us not to "overlook the actual fact that dominion over 
things is also imperium over our fellow human beings" (p. 221, 
emphasis original), and describes as "seminal" the distinction "be-
nveen property for use and property for power" (p. 222). The 
authors assert that "[w]hen we get to the distinction between prop-
erty for use and property for power ... we are getting to the point 
of trying to decide what the courts and other authoritative bodies 
ought to protect" (p. 223, emphasis original). Why this distinction 
gets us to the point of addressing the "oughts" of property law, or 
how it helps to resolve normative issues, are questions that the 
authors leave not only unanswered but unasked. Instead, the authors 
10. See Leif, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. 
L. REv. 451 (1974). 
ll. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
12. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
13. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). 
14. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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point to the undeniable need "to find some outside idea or combina-
tion of ideas which may serve as a rationale for according 'property' 
protection to some interests and not to others" (p. 223). They pur-
port to begin their search for this idea in the second section of the 
chapter, which they announce as being an exploration of "some of 
the traditional justifications for property and ... some of the situa-
tions in which application of those justifications is at stake" (p. 223). 
Before they tum to the traditional justifications for property, how-
ever, the authors summarize, by way of a note entitled, "Regulation 
of Property in Land," "the policies which guide, or ought to guide, 
the formation of property rules in the absence of such broader con-
siderations as civil rights" (p. 223). But the summary is only a de-
scription of the myriad of legal problems with which the property 
course is concerned. The policy considerations that the summary 
claims to reveal seem to call for ad hoc and episodic solutions, 
rather than a principled analysis guided by an embracive concept of 
property. 
Thus, even in the chapter the authors devote to property as an 
abstract form, they adopt no framework within which abstractions 
about property might usefully proceed. Neither the vague but sug-
gestive dichotomy benveen "property for use" and "property for 
power," nor any one or all of the "traditional justifications for 
property," nor "the analytic framework for organizing the various 
types of property rules" emerges as the conceptual foundation for 
the book's study of property. Nor is there, explicitly or implicitly, 
the suggestion that such a foundation ought to be laid, that an effort 
to understand and evaluate the institution of property in terms of 
an overriding generalization would be useful. 
The call for the kind of thematic unity that this book fails to 
provide does not imply a simplistic, one-dimensional view of the 
world. What is implicit is the notion that analytical rigor and 
critical insight are not encouraged by a constant shifting ofCc:on-
ceptual perspectives. Because the book provides no overriding con-
ceptual framework, its descriptive efforts bear an uncomfortable 
resemblance to a recitation of "detailed and usually incomprehen-
sible rules," and its normative efforts have a discouraging tendency 
to degenerate into ad hoc value judgments. 
The second aspect of the book's failure to achieve thematic unity 
concerns the failure to concentrate on property qua property. In the 
nvo Prefaces to the book, one addressed to the student, the other 
to the teacher, the authors make explicit their intention to develop 
themes apart from the concept and institution of property. To the 
student, the authors suggest that 
[t]he following list of questions indicates some of the salient themes 
of this book: 
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(I) What is property? Why should this particular interest be a£. 
forded the peculiar constitutional protections granted "property" 
rights? 
(2) A right is only as good as the means by which a court will en-
force it. What alternative remedies are available to vindicate this 
right and what effect will the existence of these remedies have on 
the behavior of the possessor of the right? 
(3) Property law is the law of wealth or lack of it. What economic 
forces is the law protecting or thwarting? 
(4) To what extent does the personal situation of the parties (bad 
guys vs. good guys) control the result in a given case? To what ex-
tent should it? [P. xvi.] 
To the teacher, the authors suggest that 
a principal, even primary, purpose of a first-year course is to introduce 
the student to legal method ..•. In addition, we think it desirable 
that the first-year student begin studying and thinking about certain 
aspects of the law which we hope he will continue to study and think 
about all his life: the way law develops; the role of the lawyer as ad-
vocate, adviser and policy-maker; the relationship between law and 
society; and the differences between the Anglo-American and other le-
gal systems. [P. xxi.] 
These questions are certainly not irrelevant, and the educational 
aims not unworthy. Moreover, they are pursued ·with noticeable, 
often infectious, enthusiasm. The problem with this dispersal of 
thematic attention lies rather in the fact that the very real intellec-
tual effort that the book generates is spread too thin, over too large 
a slice of legal life. It is one thing to hope that first-year students 
will come to appreciate that the law is characterized by the con-
tinual interaction of seemingly disparate doctrines, the constant 
presence of systematic and jurisprudential issues, an unending 
variety of analytical approaches, and an inevitable confrontation 
with moral and ethical questions. It is quite another thing usefully 
to capture all of this extraordinary richness in one book that pur-
ports to be concerned principally with the concept and institution 
of property. 
That the themes and topics that compete for a student's atten-
tion in this book are almost incredibly varied and broad-ranging is 
perhaps indicated by a summary of one typical chapter. The first 
chapter of the book is entitled, "Establishing the Distinction be-
tween Meus and Tuus." Its 154 pages are divided into five sections. 
The first four sections-on possession and wild animals, legal con-
sequences of the label "possession," bailment, and adverse posses-
sion-cover fairly conventional, introductory doctrinal and legal 
ground. The fifth section, called, "Getting a Perspective on Pos-
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session," contains 13 pages of "some philosophy, some history, some 
comparative law, and some analysis" (p. 142), principally in the 
form of excerpts from and questions on the views of Pollock and 
Maitland, Blackstone, Maine, and Holmes. 
In the first four sections, cases combined with the authors' pro-
vocative questions and pointed textual notes present excellent op-
portunities for developing nascent analytical skills and elucidating 
legal doctrine. In addition, there is a substantial amount of textual 
material and numerous questions that raise significant jurispruden-
tial issues. A list of some of the topics covered by the supplementary 
textual notes hints at the breadth of concerns that the student is 
invited to consider in connection with the principal cases: The 
notes cover, inter alia, forms, ·writs, and procedural matters; the 
reception into the American legal system of the English common 
law; the reporting of cases; double jeopardy and government 
appeals; property crimes; game laws; the history of English actions 
to recover personal property; actions to recover personal property; 
actions to recover real property; burden of proof and presumptions; 
Hohfeldian analysis; prescriptive easements; and adverse possession 
of chattels. 
The questions that are integrated into the supplementary notes 
cover equally broad ground-to recount even a substantial number 
of them would tiresomely prolong this review. It may suggest the 
typically ambitious character of the inquiries to note that a two-
column summary of double jeopardy, which appears in the first 
chapter of this property casebook, is followed by two paragraphs of 
questions in which the student is asked to judge the constitution-
ality of an Ohio statute that permits the state to appeal a criminal 
case for the purpose of establishing the law at issue, to compare that 
statute with the Federal Criminal Appeals Act, to evaluate the two 
statutes "in the light of the notion that judges should only decide 
'live' cases," and to probe the issue of whether the separate trial of 
defendants is an administrative abuse of the criminal process by the 
prosecutor's office (p. 24)1 However provocative such questions may 
be, however informative the supplementary notes, it is my view that 
they pose insurmountable obstacles to the achievement of the 
focused attention and depth of understanding indicative of a book 
upon which thematic unity has been successfully imposed. 
With respect to the second issue that first-year casebook writers 
must resolve, subject-matter inclusion, this book successfully surveys 
a significant amount of property law. The authors have included 
some material on nearly all of the topics conceivably relevant to the 
burgeoning property course: from possession of wild animals to 
future interests and the rule against perpetuities, from gifts of 
personal property to public control of land use and the basics of 
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water law and oil and gas law. Substantial coverage is given to land-
lord and tenant law, with modem developments well integrated 
into the materials, as well as to private use rights comprehended in 
the law of nuisance, covenants, and easements. Commercial aspects 
of real estate development-vendor and purchaser rights, mort-
gages and other financing devices, recording acts and title protection 
-are telescoped into a short but remarkably thorough concluding 
chapter. 
Those who believe that the commerdal aspects of property law 
are either the appropriate organizing theme for the course or at 
least the proper focus of significant analytical concern will be un-
satisfied with the book's coverage. This is as it should be; the 
authors' rejection of such an eIJ?.phasis was deliberate and integral 
to their view of the proper aims of the course. This review will not 
dwell further on the question whether the authors are correct in 
their choice of emphasis: Those who think they are wrong are likely 
to dismiss the book from serious consideration anyway, and those 
who think they are right will no doubt be more concerned with 
the book's execution of its premises. Suffice it to say that the authors 
have achieved their aim to present materials covering many mani-
festations of property law in a context that deemphasize~ but does 
not omit commercial aspects of land development. Within this con-
text the book offers the opportunity to satisfy a wide variety of 
topical preferences. 
The third issue that faces casebook writers, that of performing 
the twin tasks of doctrinal elucidation and analytical training, is 
resolved in a manner significantly different from that of other books 
in the field. The authors have not relied solely on traditional case-
book materials. Although cases are used to sound major doctrinal 
themes and to offer significant opportunities for analysis, they prob-
ably comprise less than half of the book's contents. Extensive back-
ground materials appear in many forms. The authors have written 
extensive textual notes; they have reprinted often lengthy excerpts 
from the expository and analytical ·writings of others; they have 
included many statutes, uniform acts, and samples of pertinent 
documents. Integrated into these background materials is a multi-
tude of questions that seek to evoke analysis of or to exhort critical _ 
thought about the problems that the materials raise. Critical 
thought is further encouraged by the occasional appearance of a 
"problem" that raises analytical points analogous to those covered 
by the materials. 
The notes are reasonably successful in imparting information 
about historical development and doctrinal content. Additionally, 
they generate a sense of immediacy and relevance by placing legal 
problems in their contemporary setting and noting the direction 
628 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 78 
of and often the impetus for legal change. The notes provide the 
principal vehicle by which the authors execute their design to 
"survey" property law; they explore the surface of a broad area 
rather than probe in depth a more narrow field. Of course, the risk 
of acquiring knowledge by survey is superficiality. Superficial knowl-
edge may have the merit of not being "no knowledge," but super-
ficial legal knowledge has the potential for mischief when 
administered in large doses to would-be lavvyers. The authors seem 
aware of this risk, and provide constant warnings that their coverage, 
while inclusive, is not intended to be comprehensive. 
The far more troublesome aspect of the supplementary materials 
concerns the questions that are so liberally scattered throughout. 
The authors describe the questions as being designed to make the 
material "self-teaching'' (pp. xxi, xxii), but the attempted integra-
tion of critical inquiry with textual and documentary exposition in 
my view fails to evoke productive analytical effort. In part this 
failure may be attributed simply to a lack of stylistic consistency. 
Sentences that end with question marks pervade the book. Some are 
in fact real questions, in the sense that they suggest areas for reflec-
tion and analysis. Many more, however, seem designed as topic 
sentences indicating the subject matter of the textual paragraphs 
that follow. Students engaged in self-teaching may well be excused 
for failing to pause and reflect over the "real" questions, because 
they assume that the questions will be "answered" later in the text. 
The failure to evoke analytical effort, however, is not wholly 
susceptible to stylistic cure. In the first place, even the most specific 
and well-focused questions are unlikely to induce the active intel-
lectual participation necessary to nurture analytical skill when 
based upon textual exposition and abstract discussion. Second, the 
questions canvass too broad a range of concerns, from the most 
specific to the most general. And there are too many of them. They 
reflect the book's basic failure to sustain thematic unity, the result 
of which in this context is the dilution of intellectual effort. Third, 
some of the questions are so incredibly difficult, and call upon such 
a vast body of legal knowledge and jurisprudential insight, that it is 
almost impossible to take seriously their invitation to thoughtful 
consideration by beginning law students. Is it likely, for example, 
that a first-year student-one who has just grappled with the intri-
cacies of Shelley v. Kraemer,15 Bell v. Maryland,16 State v. Shack,11 
and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.18 and been presented with a five-
15. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
16. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
17. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). 
18. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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page excerpt from title VIII of the Civil Rights Act19 and a textual 
exposition of Reitman v. Mulkey20 and its progeny-will be either 
equipped or inclined to expend meaningful intellectual effort on 
the following three questions: 
(a) On the basis of these cases try to determine what is and is not 
constitutionally permissible for a state to do in the fair housing area? 
(b) What ought to be the respective roles of private parties, 
courts, administrative bodies, and legislatures in the fair housing 
area? 
(c) Are there grounds for discrimination not covered by federal 
legislation which a state could and should prohibit, for example, sex, 
presence of children in household, status as welfare recipient, age? 
[P. 217.] 
Admittedly, there is no one right way to approach any subject in 
the law school curriculum, and property is no exception. Some will 
find that the chief merit of this book lies in the very scope and 
variety of issues that it presents. These authors have put rich re-
sources of knowledge, critical insight, and analytical skills at our dis-
posal; and they have done so with vitality and ·with an infectious 
perception of the intricacy and complexity of property law and the 
legal system. It seems doubly unfortunate, therefore, to have to 
conclude as I do that the book's basic failure to provide an em-
bracive conceptual pattern turns out to be a fundamental flaw. 
Without such a pattern, the promise offered by the richness and 
variety of the materials is not fully realized. 
19. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-19 (1970). 
20. 387 U.S. 869 (1967). 
Lillian R. BeVier 
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University of Virginia 
